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Monet supistuvilla toimialoilla työskentelevät yritykset joutuvat järjestelemään uudelleen 
toimintaansa nykyisen kiihtyvän kilpailun oloissa. Näitä aloja edustavat etujärjestöt ovat 
kuitenkin usein onnistuneet saamaan valtiovallan tukiaisia. Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan 
tappiota tuottavan yrityksen päätöstä joko hankkia tukiaisia tai uudistaa tuotantoa 
viitekehyksenä Mageen ym. (1989) ns. contributions-peli. Lisäksi tarkastellaan tullien 
roolia kilpailukyvyttömien toimintojen uudelleenjärjestelyssä. Tutkimuksessa käy ilmi 
ensinnäkin se, että etujärjestötoiminnan rahoituksen ja resursseja vaativan 
uudelleenjärjestelyn välillä on valintatilanne siten, että molempia rahoitetaan mallissa. 
Vastapuolimaan asettamat rangaistustullit tuetulle viennille suuntaavat taas optimipäätöstä 
uudelleenjärjestelyihin ja siten koventavat budjettirajoitetta. Siksi malli osoittaa, että 
ulkoiset rajoitteet, kuten rangaistustullit, voivat auttaa sisäisen rahoituskurin 
saavuttamisessa, kun parhaat mahdolliset sääntelykeinot ovat poliittisia mahdottomia. 
Sosiaalisen hyvinvoinnin kannalta uudelleenjärjestely olisi tavoiteltavaa, joten poliittinen 
kilpailu aiheuttaa mallissa kustannuksia.  
 
Asiasanat: pehmeät budjettirajoitteet, uudelleenjärjestely, poliittinen talous, etujärjestöt, 
kauppapolitiikka, supistuvat toimialat 
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Abstract
In today’s increasingly competitive business environment, many ﬁrms in declining
industries have been confronted with the need to restructure. However, lobbies in
these industries have often managed to attract government subsidies instead. This pa-
per looks at the decision of a loss-making ﬁrm whether to lobby for subsidies or whether
to restructure in the context of a contributions game as in Magee et al. (1989). We
further analyse the role of tariﬀs in restricting uncompetitive practices such as granting
state aid to unproﬁtable ﬁrms. Several results stand out. Firstly, there is a trade-oﬀ
between spending resources on lobbying for subsidies and costly restructuring such that
both restructuring and subsidisation take place in our model. Secondly, countervail-
ing tariﬀs on subsidised exports shift the decision in favour of restructuring, thereby
hardening budget constraints. Hence, the model illustrates that external constraints
such as countervailing tariﬀs can help to establish internal ﬁnancial discipline when
ﬁrst-best solutions are politically unfeasible. Thirdly, the social planner always prefers
full restructuring implying that political competition comes at a cost of lower economic
welfare in our model.
• JEL-Classiﬁcation: P26, F13
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The past dozen years have witnessed a remarkable transformation of the global economic
environment. The European Union’s (EU) common market, through the introduction of ro-
bust competition law, has grown into a global powerhouse comprising 25 members. Markets
in Canada, the United States (US) and Mexico have liberalised and integrated through the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994. At the global level, the General
Agreements on Tariﬀs and Trade (GATT) has been adopted to promote trade liberalisation.
The World Trade Organization (WTO), established in 1995, actively helps resolve inter-
national trade conﬂicts and discourage unfair trade practices such as dumping and state
subsidies.1
This new economic environment has not only boosted opportunities for trade and ex-
ploited the beneﬁts of a more competitive global economy, it has also forced many sectors to
restructure, cut costs and make heavy investments in new technologies to stay competitive
(The Economist,A p r i l2 9 ,2 0 0 0 ) .
However, not all markets have been liberalised and government intervention remains
widespread. Apart from setting the regulatory environment for free competition and trade,
many governments (including the US and the EU) have taken direct action to shield certain
industries from international competition. For example, European and US agricultural poli-
cies still safeguard farmers from competition and involve extensive subsidisation. Equally
striking is the Bush administration’s 2002 decision to impose tariﬀs on steel imports to
the US.2 In Europe, state aid to the steel and shipbuilding industries routinely provokes
discussion about the legitimacy of regional and sectoral aid (European Commission, 2003a).
By appealing to strategic considerations such as maintaining domestic production to
safeguard independence or sociopolitical motives such as job retention and regional develop-
ment, otherwise economically non-viable industries often successfully lobby for government
subsidies. Such state aid highlights the problem of soft budget constraints (SBCs), espe-
cially where it involves recurrent bailouts of loss-making industries (Kornai, 1980). While
state aid to economically viable enterprises might induce positive welfare eﬀects e.g. through
spillover eﬀects from R&D, the eﬀects of SBCs and state aid to unviable ﬁrms are are well
documented to be negative. SBCs are blamed for shortages (Kornai, 1980), hampering in-
novation (Qian and Xu, 1998), preventing the restructuring of ﬁrms and eﬃcient resource
allocation (Kornai, 1980; Dewatripont and Roland, 1996), reducing output (Schaﬀer, 1989),
impeding economic growth (Huang and Xu, 1999) and discouraging free trade (Everaert and
Vandenbussche, 2001). At the root of all these negative eﬀects is the inability of politicians
to enforce ﬁnancial discipline. Thus, SBCs are said to originate in the paternalistic attitudes
of the state (Kornai, 1980), bargaining between politicians and ﬁrm managers (Schleifer and
Vishny, 1994), and in the dynamic context of sunk costs and asymmetric information (De-
watripont and Maskin, 1995). Among the proposed ways to alleviate political commitment
to SBCs, the most commonly mentioned are increasing competition or introducing private
ownership (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Dewatripont and Roland, 1996; Segal, 1998;
1Strictly speaking, competition authorities, not GATT, are responsible for issues of state aid. However,
when subsidised production is sold on international markets, complaints can be ﬁled with the WTO. High-
proﬁle cases include the tax break to US foreign sales corporations (now referred to as Extraterritorial
Income, or ETI) and state subsidisation of South Korea’s shipyards.
2On March 20, 2002, tariﬀs ranging from 8% to 30% were imposed for a period of three years on steel
imports from Europe, Asia and South America. These measures were abandoned on December 4, 2003 after
the WTO ruled that the tariﬀs were illegal and the EU and Japan threatened retaliation.
2Berglöf and Roland, 1998; Qian and Roland, 1998).
This paper provides a political-economy framework that allows us to propose an alter-
native approach to alleviating political commitment to SBCs. Speciﬁcally, we explore the
possibility that trade policy can act as an external commitment device in imposing hard
budget discipline on subsidised exporting ﬁrms. Collie (1991) has shown that in a strategic
trade framework tariﬀ retaliation against subsidised imports usually reverses the traditional
proﬁt-shifting argument for allowing export subsidies, which, in turn, lowers optimal subsi-
dies in equilibrium. However, such a trade framework applies solely to subsidies that improve
welfare, not to subsidies of loss-making businesses.
We present a framework for assessing the impact of countervailing tariﬀs where subsidies
do not improve welfare. Hence, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we look at
the choice of loss-making ﬁrms on whether to lobby for government support or restructure.
Decisions of such ﬁrms are modelled in the context of a contributions game where interest
groups contribute to political parties. Second, we analyse the role of tariﬀs in restricting
uncompetitive practices such as providing state aid to unproﬁtable ﬁrms. More speciﬁcally,
we propose an alternative device to help overcome the commitment problem politicians face
in curbing SBCs.
The literature on SBCs emphasises that SBCs, unlike explicit subsidies, are decided ex
post and are thus endogenous. For this reason, we pay special attention to how SBCs enter
the model. Borrowing from models of probabilistic voting (Magee et al., 1989), we distinguish
between the unit level of the subsidy and the proportion of ﬁrms that are subsidised. We
also reject the notion that political parties ﬁrst contribute to buy subsequent government
policies as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), since the latter framework primarily seeks to
explain cross-sectoral variations in tariﬀs or subsidies. Instead, we focus on how political
actors inﬂuence the extent of subsidisation within a particular sector. Therefore, we reverse
the staging of policy selection and contributions as in Magee et al. (1989).
There are two advantages to distinguishing between the unit level of a subsidy and the
proportion of ﬁrms that are subsidised. First, it allows us to make the SBC a continuous
variable. Second, it allows us to make inferences about the credibility of policy pronounce-
ments, since lobby activity can inﬂuence the scale on which policies are implemented. Policies
lacking credibility receive little political support and are not implemented. Analogously, ex
post lobby activity determines the proportion of ﬁrms that are subsidised such that the total
subsidisation budget is not ﬁxed ex ante.
The model we use comprises 2 countries, a home and foreign country. The home country
has two sectors, an unrestructured industry and a proﬁtable industry. Each of these 2 indus-
tries is backed by a political party. The unrestructured sector is supported by a conservative
party; the proﬁtable sector is backed by a reformist party. The model is timed so that in the
ﬁrst stage the two rival political parties each choose a policy programme, i.e. a unit level of
restructuring and a unit subsidy. Firms in the unproﬁtable industry and the proﬁtable in-
dustry respond to the announced policies by making contributions to political parties. Firms
in the unproﬁtable industry lobby for subsidies to escape costly restructuring. To escape
having to pay higher taxes, ﬁrms in the proﬁtable industry lobby for government policies
that force the ailing industry to restructure. Contributions are important in our model,
since they determine the proportion of ﬁrms that are restructured and the proportion that
receive government support. Production is sold in foreign markets, so the government of the
foreign country must decide in Stage 3 whether to levy a countervailing duty on subsidised
exports. Since restructuring should result in actual competitiveness, countervailing duties
3are only applied in cases where exports are subsidised. In Stage 4, ﬁrms in the home and
foreign country pursue Cournot duopoly strategies and sell in the foreign market.
One possible application of the model relates to the existence of SBCs in transition
economies. Firms in transition countries inherited an obsolete capital stock and their pro-
duction structures were distorted by faulty incentives and ineﬃciencies. To meet competitive
pressures from abroad, these ﬁrms were urged to engage in deep restructuring and reorgan-
isation (Blanchard, 1997). However instead, many ﬁrms in transition countries managed to
arrange for themselves indirect subsidies in the form of soft credit conditions, tax arrears
or arrears on social security contributions (Schaﬀer, 1998). This situation created the fear
that when markets in transition countries opened up to trade, SBCs might generate interna-
tional spillover eﬀects. Everaert and Vandenbussche (2001), for example, suggest transition
countries could export subsidised production to the EU. Moreover, the EU’s levying of anti-
dumping or countervailing duties on imports from Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs) indicates how real this fear was (European Commission, 2000).3
Another potential application of the model involves continued state support to declin-
ing or sensitive sectors in advanced market economies (e.g. agriculture, steel, textiles and
shipbuilding). Such industries are typically threatened by competition from lower-wage
countries. Although productivity and technology-enhancing restructuring might help these
sectors regain competitiveness, such reforms are often opposed by powerful lobbies for state
support or protection.4 Extensive unionisation, high industry concentration and the regional
importance of ailing industries often go hand in hand with eﬀective lobbying for government
involvement (Willmann, 2002). Farm lobbies and textile lobbies (through prolonged protec-
tion from the Multi-Fibre Arrangements) have been particularly successful in this respect.
Conversely, increased government protection can ultimately endanger an industry allow-
ing that industry to postpone its shift to new technologies (Matsuyama, 1990; Miyagiwa and
Ohno, 2001; Crowley, 2002; Everaert, 2003).
For our purposes, the case of the transition country will be considered as our prin-
cipal example. “Ailing” or “declining” industries are then equivalents for unrestructured
and uncompetitive state-owned ﬁrms. The economic viability of such ﬁr m si sn o ts om u c h
jeopardised by a shift in international comparative advantage (as is the case with declin-
ing industries in advanced market economies) but rather by ineﬃciencies inherited from the
socialist system. Throughout the paper, we use the terms “declining,” “ailing,” “unrestruc-
tured,” “old,” or “state-owned” sector interchangeably. “Growing,” “new,” “proﬁtable” and
“small and medium-sized” ﬁrms refer to competitive ﬁrms in our model.
The model conveys several insights. First, it identiﬁes the tradeoﬀ between spending
resources on lobbying for subsidies and engaging in costly restructuring. The cost of lobbying
can thus outweigh the beneﬁt of subsidisation. In our model, therefore, both restructuring
and subsidisation take place in the unproﬁtable sector. Next, we show that countervailing
tariﬀs on subsidised exports shift the decision in favour of restructuring, thereby hardening
budget constraints. In the relationship between transition countries and the EU, this suggests
external constraints (e.g. countervailing tariﬀs levied by the EU on subsidised exports from
3Anecdotical evidence suggests that Russia’s subsidised energy supplies to ﬁrms in CEECs are sometimes
invoked as the basis for an antidumping action, e.g. fertilizer imports into the EU (Oﬃcial Journal, L 238/15,
22.9.2000).
4European shipyards, for example, adopted strategies geared to high value-added market segments. As a
result, specialty shipbuiding (cruise ships, repair and ship conversion, ferry vessels, icebreakers, small tankers,
etc.) has survived (European Commission, 2003c). Nevertheless, shipbuilding generally remains plagued by
overcapacity and unfair or uncompetitive trade practices (especially with respect to South Korean shipyards).
4transition countries) can help governments in transition countries overcome the problem
of committing to enforcement of hard budget discipline. Thus, foreign trade policy can
help impose ﬁnancial discipline and promote the restructuring of uncompetitive ﬁrms in
transition countries.5 Third, comparing the predictions of the model with the decisions of
a social planner, we shown that planners always prefer full restructuring. In our model,
allowing a free political system comes at the cost of lower economic welfare.
The paper links with a number of strands of the literature. First, this work follows in the
tradition of the SBC literature originating with Kornai (1980). We combine two approaches
from the earlier literature that model and explain the existence of SBCs: the importance
of political considerations (Schleifer and Vishny, 1994) and the inherent endogeneity of the
SBC phenomenon (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). The novelty of our approach arises from
the fact that we put diverging interests between gainers and losers from SBCs central to the
analysis. Moreover, our SBC variable is decided ex post, making it continuous.T h u s ,t h e
softness of the budget constraint is neither ﬁxed nor decided upon ex ante.6
Second, in line with Collie (1991), we illustrate how trade policy can also help harden
budget constraints. As mentioned, traditional arguments concentrate on competition and
privatisation as channels of institutional reform fostering budget discipline. However, these
arguments also oddly assume politicians, capable of designing eﬃciency-enhancing privati-
sation schemes and implement eﬀective competition policies, are for some reason unable
to enforce budget discipline.7 Some authors have recently proposed alternative frameworks
to overcome the SBC problem. Che (2002), for example, suggests that loss-making ﬁrms
might be allowed to enter bankruptcy if the government designs fair individual compen-
sation schemes for the displaced workers. The up-front costs here, however, can easily be
so daunting that they prohibit adoption of such “eﬃcient” policies. Brücker et al. (2003)
suggest that a government in a transition country can enforce budget discipline in a war
of attrition by withholding its EU membership application. Such an EU conditionality is
thus associated with hard budget constraints. However, it remains unresolved how a gov-
ernment would be able to commit to withholding its EU membership application and wait
until its ﬁrms start restructuring without being able to commit to enforcing budget dis-
cipline directly. The advantage of the approach in this paper is that the decision to levy
countervailing duties is completely outside the reach of domestic politicians, i.e. it can be
considered a genuine external constraint. We show that levying such countervailing duties
is indeed welfare improving for the foreign country (EU). Our results are related to litera-
ture on how external constraints help overcome time-inconsistent domestic policies. Policy
delegation to an independent body has been a typical example of an external constraint
in the ﬁeld of monetary economics (Cukierman, 1992). Other examples are international
trade agreements such as GATT (Staiger and Tabellini, 1999) or environmental protection
(Conconi and Perroni, 2003). Such agreements help governments commit to superior policies
that would otherwise not be credible domestically. Analogously, Bertero and Rondi (2000)
present empirical evidence as to how the requirements for joining the European single market
5See Everaert and Vandenbussche (2001) for an earlier formulation of this idea.
6This paper is the ﬁrst we know of that models SBCs as a continuous variable, which Kornai (1980)
considered a distictive characteristic of SBCs. In contrast, Schleifer and Vishny (1994) and Dewatripont and
Maskin (1995) use a ﬁxed explicit transfer variable to represent the SBC and focus on incentives that give
rise to SBCs.
7The prescribed “cure” for alleviating SBCs could suﬀer the same credibility problems as tackling the
SBC “disease” itself. Examples include insider privatisation schemes and competition policies that only
break up conglomerates into complementary parts.
5disciplined Italian state-owned enterprises to respect budget limits. We argue here that EU
countervailing tariﬀs against subsidised exports from transition countries can be an equally
powerful external constraint to enforce hard budget discipline — something that domestic
politicians from CEECs cannot credibly commit to themselves.
Third, this work relates to contribution approaches in the political economy of trade pol-
icy (Magee et al., 1989; Grossman and Helpman, 1994),8 which typically deal with lobbying
for pro-trade or pro-protectionist policies in the framework of a small, perfectly competitive
economy. Closer to our work are Brainard and Verdier (1994, 1997), who explicitly consider
the option of lobbying for restructuring (as well as lobbying for tariﬀ protection). However,
their work is primarily concerned with explaining the pattern of senescent industry collapse
in line with the seminal paper of Cassing and Hillman (1986). Here, we follow Hillman and
Ursprung (1988) in building upon the contributions framework of Magee et al. (1989). We
apply the model to the context of transition countries where lobbyists promote either the
restructuring or the subsidising of an uncompetitive industry. We do not consider the pos-
sibility that transition countries choose to protect uncompetitive industries through raising
tariﬀs, as one of the major pillars of transition reforms notably consisted of trade liberali-
sation. By 1996 all Central and Eastern European Accession countries had signed Europe
Agreements with the EU that established free trade in industrial products with the EU.9,10.
Also, in contrast to previous approaches, we consider a model with imperfect competition in
an international setup. To our knowledge, only Moore and Suranovic (1993) have previously
studied lobbying for subsidisation with imperfect competition on the product market. How-
ever, they consider a third-country model and disregard the eﬀects of political competition.
Finally, our work contributes to the literature on the political economy of transition
(Roland, 2000) by discussing restructuring and the reallocation of resources from the declin-
ing state sector towards a highly productive, growing private sector.11 Although this lit-
erature has the advantage of incorporating dynamic issues such as the optimal speed of
transition and the preferred staging of reforms (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995; Roland,
2000; Castanheira and Roland, 2000), transition itself is often modelled rather mechanicis-
tically, disregarding the eﬀects of political opposition to reforms or lobbying (Rodrik, 1995).
Our paper seeks to incorporate explicitly the process of political rivalry within an economic
model of SBCs and clarify Schleifer and Vishny’s (1994) link between politicians and ﬁrms by
relating the lobby contributions of interest groups to the election probabilities of politicians,
albeit within a static framework.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the model and solve
for its subsequent stages by backward induction. The equilibrium concept we use is thus sub-
game perfection. We ﬁrst solve for the benchmark case, i.e. the case where countervailing
tariﬀs are absent. In Section 3 we introduce countervailing tariﬀs on subsidised exports and
analyse how they aﬀect incentives to lobby for subsidisation. The problem for the social
8There is a growing body of literature that empirically tests the contributions approaches for the US. See
Goldberg and Maggi (1999), and Baldwin and Magee (2000).
9Although the EU must open its markets more quickly than the associated countries, the Europe Agree-
ments neverthelss aim at establishing free trade in industrial products over a gradual transition period.
Restrictions to free trade appear in only a few sectors, most notably agriculture and textiles (European
Commission, 2003b).
10For some political economy explanations of trade policy in CEECs , see e.g. Hillman and Ursprung
(1996) and Wunner (1998).
11Note that transition here also often involves a redirection away from production by large enterprises
towards a revival of small and medium-sized ﬁrms.
6welfare planner is addressed in Section 4. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 The benchmark model
In this section, we analyse whether ﬁrms in unproﬁtable industries choose to restructure or
lobby to receive subsidies. More speciﬁcally, we introduce restructuring and subsidisation of
loss-making ﬁrms in the context of a political economy where some sectors in the economy
beneﬁt from SBCs while others suﬀer. We show how the SBC is determined ex post and
modelled as a continuous variable. Several comparative static results are discussed.
2.1 Setup
Consider a three-stage model with two countries, a home and a foreign country, and two
sectors in the home country, a declining or old sector and a growing or new sector. Firms in
the old sector compete with ﬁrms from the foreign country, whereas ﬁrms in the new sector
of the home country produce a diﬀerent good for local consumption only.
More speciﬁcally, we consider a home country, i.e. a transition economy, that consists of
n small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which represent the new sector, and 1 state-
owned enterprise (SOE), which represents the old industry. The latter is a normalisation,
since one can think of diﬀerent ﬁrms in the old industry as business units of the larger state-
owned company. The SMEs produce a horizontally diﬀerentiated good for the local home
market and each ﬁrm makes a positive proﬁt F
n > 0,b e c a u s ef r e ee n t r yi nt h eS M Es e c t o r
has not yet driven all positive proﬁt st oz e r o—ap l a u s i b l es c e n a r i oi na ne m e r g i n gm a r k e t
economy or for a growing industry. Note also that sector proﬁts F are completely exogenous
to the model. Our SOE, on the other hand, produces for and exports to a foreign market
(e.g. the EU).12,13 Hence, the old and new sectors of the home country do not compete with
one another either domestically or abroad. Other topologies can be envisaged (e.g. the new
and old sectors compete), but the focus in this paper is on competition between the declining
sector and the foreign ﬁrm, where the locally producing sector — in the case of subsidisation
— is taxed to cross-ﬁnance subsidies to the ailing industry.
Subsidisation might arise (as we assume the ﬁrm belongs to the old industry) from
inherited central planning ineﬃciencies so the ﬁrm has higher marginal costs than a ﬁrm
in the foreign country. More speciﬁcally, the marginal cost in the SOE, c,o n c ef a c e dw i t h
competition (from) abroad, turns out to be prohibitively high, making further production
unproﬁtable. The marginal cost in the foreign country, cf, is substantially lower: c>c f.14
12For reasons of simplicity, we exclude consumer surplus from the model. A completely analogous result
would be obtained if the home country were to import from the foreign country. However, the current setup
is more intuitive when we discuss the eﬀects of countervailing tariﬀs on subsidised exports in Section III.
13We are quite aware of studies that attribute exporting to eﬃcient ﬁrms (e.g. Clerides et al. 1996; Melitz,
2003). In our model, the exporting ﬁrm (SOE) is considered unproﬁtable if it refrains from restructuring
or lobbies for subsidies. In the model setup, the SOE is forced to engage in one of these activities so that
it either becomes eﬃcient or is (over)compensated with subsidies that hide its ineﬃciency. In either case,
we observe eﬃcient ﬁrms exporting to the EU. As such, we do not contradict the literature (Repkine and
Walsch, 1999; De Loecker and Konings, 2003). Our point is merely that observed proﬁtability may be due to
successful lobbying rather than genuine competitive advantage obtained from restructuring. Anti-dumping
actions of the EU against CEEC imports, even long before transition commences, might be indicative of
this. See Footnote 3 for anecdotical evidence.
14Consider the following example. Despite cheaper labour costs in the foreign transition country, w, labour
productivity in the transition country, g(α) is so low as to make productivity-adjusted marginal costs higher:
7Therefore, the SOE needs to restructure or rely on government subsidies to survive.15
Throughout the model, we assume that both restructuring and subsidisation are two
valuable options to make production in the home country’s declining sector proﬁtable again.
We assume, however, that subsidisation is more attractive to the SOE, since restructuring
is costly for ﬁrms in the old sector.16
We also assume that the decision to restructure or subsidise a ﬁrm in the declining sector
can be inﬂuenced with political contributions (Magee et al., 1989). In other words, the
amount of contributions inﬂuence the extent to which proposed policies are implemented.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that the government of the home country consists of two rival
political parties, a pro-reform party, and a conservative socialist party. The former advocate
restructuring and the latter favour subsidisation. Both parties compete for power and elec-
toral results are determined by campaign contributions given to political parties (standard
probabilistic voting models). Campaign contributions are important ﬁnancial resources for
political parties and can aﬀect voting behaviour directly or indirectly e.g. by inﬂuencing
voter turnout at the elections.17 We further assume that in the absence of campaign contri-
butions, each party faces an equal chance of winning the elections. Hence, in a representative
democracy, the ﬁrm in the declining industry faces an equal probability of being restructured
or subsidised. Assuming that government representation is reﬂected in actual policies, this
means that 50% of the ailing industry is restructured and the other 50% receives government
support. However, in our model, the SOE is not indiﬀerent to the choice of restructuring
and receiving subsidies — it strongly prefers subsidies to bearing the hefty costs of restructur-
ing.18,19 Nor are ﬁrms in the growing segment of the economy indiﬀerent to the old sector’s
preference to subsidisation over restructuring. Since the burden of taxation to ﬁnance sub-
sidies falls on SMEs, the latter consistently prefer that old ﬁrms restructure. Thus, both
groups are willing to give campaign contributions to promote electoral victories for the party
that promises to inﬂuence the proportion of ﬁrms that are restructured.
Subsidisation is assumed to be more attractive to the SOE than restructuring, but from
a social welfare point of view, we ﬁnd restructuring is always preferable to subsidisation (see
Section 4). As such, our results diﬀer from those in a strategic trade setting where subsidies
are always considered welfare-optimising (Collie, 1991; Everaert and Vandenbussche, 2001).
The timing of the model is depicted in Figure 1. To summarise, in the ﬁrst stage, two
rival political parties, a conservative and a reformist party, respectively, choose a level of a
policy parameter, a unit subsidy s and a unit level of restructuring α respectively, taking
c>c f, where productivity g is a positive function of the level of restructuring α. Low labour productivity
in the transition country can be due to the presence of an old and obsolete capital stock and ineﬃcient
ways of production as compared to Western production methods. Low product quality further necessitates
restructuring.
15Exit is a plausible alternative to restructuring and subsidisation. However, as it would jeopardise em-
ployment in the home country, we do not deal with this possibility.
16For further possibilities, see Appendix.
17Although explicit modelling of the voting game is beyond the scope of this paper, election outcomes are
apparent after Stage 2.
18The SOE also prefers restructuring over subsidisation in the absence of any conﬂict of interest between
the SOE and the SMEs. However, we will see that positive contributions are not excluded in this case. For
a full discussion, see Appendix.
19In a dynamic context, Rodrik (1995) shows that, at the onset of transition, workers in SOEs might prefer
low or no subsidies to increase their chance of ﬁnding a job in the growing private sector of the economy and
increase their wages once they are employed in the private sector. As transition proceeds, however, this no
longer holds, and workers in SOEs always prefer high subsidies. Our example here would be classiﬁed as the
latter case.
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* conservative party: s    * SOE-lobby: Csoe                                * SOE: X 
                                                                                                     * foreign firm: X
f 
Figure 1: Timing in the model
into account both welfare considerations and the self-interest motives of politicians. One
can think of these as announcements of the policies parties want to pursue when they come
into power. Note that while we assume that parties can commit to levels of s and α (e.g.
they promise a certain subsidy per worker), they cannot commit ahead of time to a total
subsidisation budget.
The ﬁrms (or workers) that eventually get subsidised are determined by lobby activity
in Stage 2, whereby contributions determine the proportion of ﬁrms in the declining sector
that are restructured, q, or subsidised, 1 − q, given the unit levels of restructuring α and
subsidy rates s at which restructuring and subsidisation occurs.
In the ﬁnal stage, the old ﬁrm in the home country competes with the foreign ﬁrm in the
foreign market and both ﬁrms choose quantities accordingly. The parties pursue a Cournot
duopoly strategy.20
The order of stages in the game is motivated by the idea that SBCs should be modelled
endogenously and as a continuous variable, i.e. the softness of the budget constraint should
not be determined ex ante. Thus, the unit level of the subsidy is determined before the
proportion of ﬁrms that beneﬁt from this subsidy is decided. One can easily imagine a sub-
sidisation scheme, initiated by the government, for which some ﬁrms automatically qualify,
but where others need to lobby to receive a subsidy. Alternatively, the order of stages follows
the election game, during which subsidies are proposed. The extent to which the subsidies
are actually implemented, however, depends on the political support they receive. Hence,
total subsidisation outlays can only be known after Stage 2. From this point of view, we
capture the endogenous and continuous nature of a SBC and use it in our modelling as such.
We now solve for the benchmark case of the model. In section 3, we introduce counter-
vailing tariﬀs.
2.2 Stage 3: Production
Consider production decisions at the ﬁnal stage of the game. The home and the foreign ﬁrm
produce an identical good for the foreign market and compete in setting quantities. In the
event the home ﬁr mc h o o s e st or e s t r u c t u r e—d e n o t e dac a s eq — the problem amounts to
20Since we choose the marginal cost of the home ﬁrm such that it drives its market share to zero when
faced with competition from the foreign ﬁrm (infra), the case of a homogeneous Betrand competition is more
intuitive. Higher marginal costs automatically lead to exit of the ﬁrm with the higher marginal cost (i.e.
we do not even need to assume c = 1
2). However, Betrand competition with homogeneous goods leads to
discontinuity of the proﬁt function and complicates the analysis in Stage 2. Moreover, in case of Bertrand











f =( P − c
f)X
f,
where π and πf are home and foreign proﬁts, respectively, and where X and Xf, respectively,
stand for home and foreign production. Marginal costs after restructuring in the home
country are denoted as cR(α), i.e. a negative function of the level of restructuring α.F o r
simplicity, we assume that restructuring linearly decreases marginal costs of the home ﬁrm,
c,s u c ht h a t
cR(α)=c − α.
The marginal cost for the foreign producer is denoted cf,w h e r ecf <c . Note that home
proﬁts are reduced by the total cost of restructuring γ α2
2 , i.e. investment in new technologies
quadratically increases with the intensity of restructuring α as in the literature on cost-
reducing investment (Brainard and Verdier, 1994; Abel et al., 1996). The parameter γ
indicates how costly it is to restructure in general.
Inverse demand is given by
P = a − b(X + X
f),
where P is the price of the identical good produced. Without loss of generality (i.e. normal-




To simplify, we further assume that
b =1 .
Cournot-Nash solutions to the maximisation problem above yield
X |q =








Under the subsidisation regime — denoted as case 1−q —t h eh o m eﬁrm is given a positive
subsidy s to the marginal cost. We consequently solve
max
X
π =( P − c + s)X
max
Xf π













10Second order conditions (SOCs) for a maximum are satisﬁed in both cases.
Next, we assume that productivity in the home country is so low (despite, say, low labour
costs) that no production takes place in the absence of subsidisation or restructuring.21 This
forces the home government to engage in some kind of reform. From (2) and (3), we derive
an expression for the home marginal costs22







Using the result from (4), we presume that, in case q, this yields optimal choices of X























]= ⇒ α ∈ [0;
3
2
] when cR(α)=c − α.
2.3 Stage 2: Lobbying
We now look at lobby activity in Stage 2 of the model. From expression (6), subsidisation is
clearly attractive to the ailing industry as it yields positive proﬁts. However, since subsidies
are ﬁnanced by taxing proﬁts of the growing industry, they are unattractive to the latter.
F a c e dw i t ht h i sc o n ﬂict, both sectors in the home economy form interest groups — one to lobby
to for exempting the SOE sector from costly restructuring and another to oppose increasing
the tax burden on the SME sector. To focus on the main issues here, we ignore possible
free-riding problems associated with the formation of interest groups. We also assume that
contributions are one-sided and only given to the aﬃliated political party, i.e. we exclude the
possibility of dual contributions and the possibility that the SOE sector contributes to the
reformist party to be excluded from restructuring. Analogously, we assume that the SME
sector cannot bribe the members of the conservative party to convince them of the need to
restructure (Austen-Smith, 1987; for discussion, see Mayer and Li, 1994).
Lobbying inﬂuences the proportion of ﬁrms that are restructured or subsidised (Magee
et al., 1989). We denote the proportion of ﬁrms in the declining sector that are restructured
with q,w h e r eq is related to the contributions Ci,i= sme,soe in the following way:23
21The assumption does not rule out the possibility of zero contributions. Whether or not contributions
are made depends on how attractive subsidisation is to the SOE (see Appendix).
22Note that the condition X |α=s=0 =0places an upper bound to the possible range of values for c.G i v e n
that c>c f, we also have a supremum, i.e. c ∈]0; 1
2]. For discussion, see Appendix.
23Notice that the levels of s and α only aﬀect the propensity to contribute Ci, but do not aﬀect the
probabilities q and 1 − q directly. This is a diﬀerence with the set-up in Magee et al. (1989), but similar to
Hillman and Ursprung (1988). Further, the expression q is not derived from structural foundations, but it
is simple and intuitive way to explicitly model the link between politicians and ﬁrms.
11q =
Csme + ε
Csme + Csoe +2 ε
=P r [ restruct.]
1 − q =
Csoe + ε
Csme + Csoe +2 ε
=P r [ subsid.].
We can interpret q as the probability a ﬁrm gets restructured or the proportion of ﬁrms in
the declining sector that are restructured, given the fact that the size of the declining sector
has been normalised to one. If election outcomes are a function of campaign contributions,
q can be interpreted as the probability that the reformist party wins the elections, or else,
the percentage of seats in parliament the party will obtain. Its presence in parliament will
then be reﬂected in the weight its policies carry. This assumption is critical.24,25
Note that we have included a term ε > 0,w h i c hr e ﬂects the ineﬀectiveness of lobbying.
It represents the diﬃculty of manipulating or subverting politicians or election outcomes.
Similarly, ε/2ε reﬂects the proportion of ﬁrms that are restructured in the absence of con-
tributions. Note that including ε overcomes mathematical problems where contributions are
equal to zero.
Using comparative statics, we show that higher contributions from the SME sector in-





(Csme + Csoe +2 ε)2 > 0.
On the other hand, an increase in the contributions of the SOE to the conservative party





(Csme + Csoe +2 ε)2 < 0.
Analogously, the probability a SOE gets subsidised is positively related to the contributions










(Csme + Csoe +2 ε)2 > 0.
Lobbies of the SME and SOE sectors are assumed to have the following expected utility
functions (Hillman and Ursprung, 1988, Magee et al., 1989):
E[Lsme]=−Csme + q[F]+( 1− q)[F − sX]
E[Lsoe]=−Csoe + q[(P − cR)X − γ
α2
2
]+( 1− q)[(P − c + s)X].
24The assumption that the support for policies carries over proportionally towards eﬀectuated policies is
important. If we do not assume proportionality, politicians will only want to maximise q up to the point
where they achieve a majority (50% + ε) and not seek to maximise q. Here, we step away from majority
voting models.
25A more general way to think about q is that political support in the form of donations determines the
weight policies carry when they are eﬀectuated.
12Firms are risk-neutral and face the uncertainty of election outcomes. Therefore their utility
consists of expected proﬁts minus outlays for contributions Ci. In case the SOE restructures,
i.e. with a probability q, cumulative after-tax proﬁts to the SMEs are F>0.I nc a s et h e
SOE refrains from restructuring, i.e. with a probability 1 − q, the SME-sector has to cross-
ﬁnance sX to the SOE. Suppose the SOE restructures, i.e. with a probability q,p r o ﬁts
to the SOE equal (P − cR)X, net of the investment cost γ α2
2 . On the other hand, in the
subsidisation regime, 1 − q, the SOE beneﬁts from a subsidy s to the marginal cost, such
that proﬁts amount to (P − c + s)X.
Note that there is an important asymmetry in the model. Whereas the cost of restructur-
ing has to be born completely by the SOE itself and entirely in the only period of production
we consider,26 subsidisation is only costly to the SOE to the extent that the SOE has to
contribute Csoe to get subsidised; the subsidies themselves are ﬁnanced through taxes on
proﬁts from the SME sector.
Thus, the interest groups maximise their utility by simultaneously choosing contributions
accordingly. This amounts to simultaneously solving
max
Csme
Lsme s.t. Lsme > 0
max
Csoe
Lsoe s.t. Lsoe > 0.







and give the reaction functions for the contributions:
































The reaction functions are deﬁned for
A>0;B<0.
Under the same conditions, SOCs for a maximum are satisﬁed. The ﬁrst condition, A>0,
implies that both the foreign ﬁrm and the SOE produce in equilibrium. The second condition,
26E.g. there is no subsidy to help the ﬁrm restructuring, neither is there a possibility to spread the total
cost of restructuring γ α2
2 over several periods where production takes place, as the model features only 1
production stage. A more dynamic set-up of the model would be an interesting extension in this respect.
27See Appendix for proof data in equilibrium Lsme > 0; Lsoe > 0 holds.
13B<0, implies that we require ﬁrms in the declining sector to strictly prefer subsidisation
over costly restructuring. This is the assumption we made in the model setup28











We have also assumed that post-restructuring proﬁts should always be positive, i.e. the













This assumption ensures that restructuring is the ﬁrst-best solution for social welfare — a
view taken in this paper (see Section 4). The fact that π |1−q is preferred to π|q by the SOE
can hence coexist with the fact that restructuring is the social ﬁrst best, given that the ﬁrst
statement has a strong partial equilibrium (or one sector) nature.
Summarising, we solve Stage 2 under the condition that











and further restrict ourselves to positive contribution schedules.29
Equilibrium values of the contributions are found at the intersection point of both reaction
functions, as shown in Figure 2. Solving for the equilibrium values by substitution, we ﬁnd
that this will always yield at least one real solution. Restricting ourselves to a positive, real
solution (see Appendix) yields
C
∗
sme = −ε −
A2B
(A − B)2,( 8 )




soe = −ε +
AB2
(A − B)2.( 9 )
Provided ε is suﬃciently small, the equilibrium contributions are positive and fall in























⇐⇒ A + B>0.
28The reverse implies that both the SOE and the SMEs prefer restructuring, which eliminates any conﬂict
of interest. Therefore, we assume that B<0. For a discussion, see Appendix.
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Figure 2: Reaction functions: equilibrium











sme < 1. (10)








With A>0 and B<0, it follows that q and 1 − q are both strictly positive and strictly
smaller than one such that both restructuring and subsidisation take place in our model.
This implies a tradeoﬀ exists for the SOE between the cost of spending resources on lobbying
(Csoe)a n dt h eb e n e ﬁto fn o th a v i n gt or e s t r u c t u r e( π |1−q − π |q). At some point, the costs
of lobbying outweigh the beneﬁts of subsidisation. However, it is still possible to rank q and
1 − q,s i n c ew i t hγ < 8















With A>−B,w eﬁnd that, in equilibrium, the proportion of restructured ﬁrms exceeds









This result may be summarised in the following proposition:
30The system oscillates as it converges to equilibrium, provided the condition (10) holds. This condition












dα > 0 ⇐⇒ γ < 8
9
dq
ds < 0 ⇐⇒ α > 0;γ < 8
9
Table 1: Comparative statics for q
Proposition 1 The cost of lobbying for subsidies might outweigh the beneﬁt of subsidisation,
such that, in equilibrium, both restructuring and subsidisation take place in the SOE. How-
ever, the contributions of the SME sector always exceed the contributions of the SOE such
that more than half of the ﬁrms in the declining sector is subject to restructuring, provided
(7) holds.
The intuition underlying this result becomes apparent by realising that the less-desirable
option for the SOE, restructuring, nevertheless still yields positive proﬁts. This reduces the
incentives to make contributions for subsidisation Csoe. On the other hand, incentives to
resist high taxes remain very strong for ﬁrms in the new sector, because such ﬁrms have
more to lose from not lobbying. When losers lobby harder (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud,
2002), the result becomes quite intuitive.31
Other interesting comparative statics with respect to q and 1−q are summarised in Table
1.
As changes in the ineﬀectiveness of lobbying ε aﬀect the size of the equilibrium contribu-
t i o n si na ni d e n t i c a lw a y ,t h eo v e r a l le ﬀect on the proportion of ﬁrms that are restructured
versus subsidised cancels out. This is in line with the intuition.
An increase in the cost of restructuring γ decreases the proportion of restructured ﬁrms
in equilibrium since the contributions of the SOE will rise more sharply than those of the
SMEs. Again, this is a highly intuitive result.
Higher levels of restructuring α, on the other hand, for costs of restructuring suﬃciently
low, i.e. γ < 8
9, give rise to a higher proportion of ﬁrms in equilibrium under the restructuring
regime. Here, SOE contributions decrease more sharply than those of SMEs.
Finally, the relation between the proportion of restructured ﬁrms and the level of the
subsidy is negative. The increase of the contribution by the SOE is stronger than the
increase of the contribution by the SME sector, such that, on average, more ﬁrms escape
restructuring.
We summarise the comparative statics results in the following propositions:
Proposition 2 The ineﬀectiveness of lobbying ε inﬂuences the propensity to contribute, but
has no eﬀect on the proportion of ﬁrms restructured.
31B a l d w i na n dR o b e r t - N i c o u d( 2 0 0 2 )r e l yo na s y m m e t r i e si ne ﬀectiveness of lobbying to arrive at a situ-
ation where losers lobby harder.
16Proposition 3 A higher cost of restructuring γ, i.e. lower proﬁtability of restructuring,
unambiguously prevents more ﬁrms from being restructured.
Proposition 4 Higher levels of restructuring α encourage more ﬁrms to restructure, pro-
vided the cost of restructuring is suﬃciently low (γ < 8
9). If costs of restructuring are very
high (γ > 8
9), a policy of deep restructuring (Blanchard, 1997) is not credible, i.e. with
γ > 8
9, in equilibrium, fewer ﬁrms choose the restructuring regime when α increases.
Proposition 5 Higher levels of the subsidy decrease the proportion of restructured ﬁrms.
The last two propositions are especially interesting because they relate to the credibility
of policy announcements. If the cost of restructuring in general is not too high (γ < 8
9),
reformist parties that announce drastic restructuring programmes (i.e. α high) receive more
political support compared to the case where they announce mediocre plans to regain com-
petitiveness. Hence, both elements reinforce each other — the deeper the restructuring, the
more ﬁrms proportionally that support it. However, if restructuring is unproﬁtable, drastic
restructuring programmes (i.e. α high) are doomed; they provoke a strong political backlash.
The credibility of the government’s restructuring plans is thus a function of γ.32
The last proposition says that political support for subsidies is positively related to the
level of this subsidy. Firms are thus quite willing to support subsidisation policies when their
payoﬀs (in terms of the subsidy they receive) are very high. Again, this is highly intuitive.
2.4 Stage 1: Choosing policy levels
The comparative statics results from Table 1 apply for any given parameter value. However,
political parties choose and announce “optimal” policy parameters in the ﬁrst stage. Suppose
political parties not only care about maximising general welfare, but also about their chance
of re-election (Magee et al., 1989).33 Alternatively, these are the percentage of seats a party
obtains in parliament or the weight attached to the policy propositions they make. Utility
functions of political parties Uref and Ucon are thus a weighted average of total welfare in
the home country, W, and of the probability of re-election, q and 1 − q, respectively. Para-
meter ϑ indicates the relative importance of the self-interest motive in politicians’ decisions.
Parameter ϑ is enclosed in [0;+∞[.H o m ew e l f a r eW consists solely of home proﬁts, since
consumption takes place in the foreign country. Thus, we seek solutions to
max
α












































































32One could interpret γ as a variable that relates the ﬁrm’s technology to that of ﬁrms at the frontier.
With high levels of γ, ﬁrms are far from the technologically most eﬃcient ﬁrms, and this might decrease
their willingness to scale up their eﬃciency (Acemoglu et al., 2002)
33In Magee et al. (1989), political parties only care about their re-election chances.






because α is restricted in α ∈ [0; 3











Thus, the choice of the policy parameter of the reformist party is neither inﬂuenced by the
relative weight of welfare considerations, nor by the conservative party’s choice of policy
programme. We summarise this in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Independent of ϑ and s, the level of restructuring is chosen maximally.
Since α∗ and s∗ are simultaneously set in the ﬁrst stage and given the above proposition,






Restricting solutions to those that are positive and satisfy A>0;B<0,w eh a v et h e
following solution to s∗,34 provided 8
9 − 16







40 − 45γ +5
p
−729γ2 + 1296γ − 576 − 540γϑ+ 480ϑ.
Interpreting this solution, we ﬁnd that, provided costs of restructuring γ are not too low
(γ > 8
9 − 16
27ϑ), there is an optimal level of subsidy that maximises politicians’ utility Ucon.
For very low costs of restructuring, however, subsidisation and lobbying for subsidisation are
unattractive, since even conservative politicians will favour restructuring and thereby elimi-
nate all competition on the political market. Note that in the case of transition economies,
the costs of restructuring were signiﬁcant — the inherited capital stock was old and the qual-
ity of products was low. The case where 8
9 − 16
27ϑ < γ < 8
9 is thus relevant here. SOCs for a
maximum are also satisﬁed. We summarise our result for s∗ in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Provided restructuring is suﬃciently costly, an optimal level of the subsidy
can be found that satisﬁes A>0 and B<0. However, when restructuring is not costly, the
optimal level of the subsidy is zero and complete restructuring results.
34At the equilibrium values α∗ and s∗, the condition (10) for stability of the contributions equilibrium is




1107 , which is a slightly stricter condition than γ > 8
9 − 16
27ϑ.
182.5 The SBC interpreted
In the model developed above, SBCs emerge because restructuring inherently generates
winners and losers. The losers then lobby the government to extend the beneﬁts they enjoyed
during socialism. Subsidies in this model acquire an endogenous dimension, since total
outlays for subsidisation in the economy ultimately depend on the contributions of lobbies
after the new policies are announced.
Our approach yields a continuous variable for SBCs. Given that, without contributions,
ﬁrms face an equal probability of being subsidised or restructured, i.e. q =1− q = 1
2,w e
take S as a measure for the softness of the budget constraint, whereby
S = s








The variable S reﬂects the total subsidisation outlays in excess of those that would result in
the absence of political contributions. Given the result from Proposition 1,
S<0.
The continuity of our SBC variable is useful in our model, since — in the spirit of Kornai
(1980) — this should be an essential characteristic of an SBC variable. To our knowledge,
our study is the ﬁrst that combines continuity with endogeneity and political elements in an
SBC model.
The novelty of this approach arises from our emphasis on the fact that SBCs generate
winners and losers. Moreover, relations between politicians and ﬁrms are more explicitly
embedded in the political structure of the real economy, adding realism to the model.
In an extensive survey on SBCs, Mitchell (2000, p.66) describes SBCs as a situation in
which a ﬁrm is “allowed to continue operating even though its assets would yield a greater
return in an alternative use.” Once we show in the Section 4 that aggregate welfare is higher
under complete restructuring, the deﬁnition straightforwardly applies to our model.
3 Countervailing tariﬀs
In the previous section, we explored the incentives for subsidisation and restructuring in
the absence of countervailing tariﬀs. Given that SBCs are generally viewed as harmful to
economic welfare, we now consider whether external constraints such as countervailing duties
can promote restructuring and harden budget constraints.
Thus, we introduce an additional stage in the model (see Figure 1) in which the foreign
government may decide to levy countervailing duties t on subsidised imports. We then look at
how this aﬀects the propensity to contribute and the proportion of ﬁrms that are subsidised.
In other words, countervailing duties may alter the incentives in the home country to lobby for
subsidisation. Restructuring, however, is assumed to confer legitimate competitive advantage
(the WTO rules out the use of countervailing measures in this case).35 While the results for
35Recall that we have taken the position that the SOE must be partially subsidised to be able to compete
abroad, i.e. subsidies obscure the SOE’s underlying ineﬃciency. Thus, countervailing duties on behalf of
the EU are justiﬁed on the basis of unfair trade practices in CEECs. In case, however, the SOE would be
genuinly more eﬃcient than the foreign (EU) ﬁrm, then special interest politics in the EU should explain
trade intervention and anti-dumping duties against CEEC imports. This, however, is not the position we
take in this model (see Footnotes 3 and 12).
19restructuring from Section 2 hold unchanged, home proﬁts under the subsidisation regime
are now
π |1−q =( P − c + s − t)X.
The foreign government may choose a countervailing tariﬀ against subsidised exports, i.e.
in the case 1 − q.T h i st a r i ﬀ is chosen to maximise foreign welfare W f,36 which consists of
foreign proﬁts πf =( P −cf)Xf,t a r i ﬀ revenue tX and — given that consumption takes place
in the foreign market — consumer surplus (X + Xf)2 1




f(t,s)=( P − c
f)X











SOCs for a maximum are satisﬁed.






























and compare both regimes for given levels of s in Table 2.
Given that, for given levels of s and α, the proportion of ﬁrms that are restructured under
the tariﬀ regime q0 is higher than when countervailing tariﬀsa r ea b s e n tq, countervailing
tariﬀs act as a constraint on the size of the subsidised sector. We summarise this in the
following proposition:
Proposition 8 Countervailing tariﬀsi n d u c em o r eﬁrms to restructure.
Note that the above proposition only holds for similar levels of s and α.T h i sn e e dn o t
be the case, since optimally chosen levels of s∗ and α∗ might diﬀer under a countervailing
tariﬀ regime. To compare total outlays for subsidisation under the two regimes (with and
without the tariﬀ), we also need to solve for s∗ in the former case. The total subsidy budget
consists of the unit subsidy s∗ multiplied by the number of production units X |1−q,s∗,t i m e s
the proportion of ﬁrms subsidised (1−q)|s∗,α∗. It is easy to show that in the countervailing
regime, the optimal solution for α∗ is found at 3
2, as in the benchmark case. However, to ﬁnd
the optimal solution to s∗, we must rely on numerical simulations. Figures 3 and 4 compare
36If the tariﬀ entirely closes the gap created by the introduction of a subsidy, i.e. s = t, all incentives
to lobby for subsidisation disappear and restructuring becomes the way to go as long as γ < 8
9 makes
restructuring attractive.
20without tariﬀ with tariﬀ
X |1−q = 2
3s > X |1−q = 4s−1
9
π |1−q |1−q= 4
9s2 > π |1−q =( 4s−1
9 )2
RF : Csoe −→ Csme > RF : Csoe −→ C0
sme
RF : Csme −→ Csoe > RF : Csme −→ C0
soe
q = A
A−B < q0 = A0
A0−B0
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Figure 3: Total subsidy outlays, γ =0 .25;γ =0 .75
total subsidy outlays s∗X |1−q,s∗ (1 − q)|s∗,α∗ under the two regimes for diﬀerent values of γ
and ϑ. The relative weight of politicians’ self-interest motive versus their concern for general
welfare, i.e. ϑ, is indicated on the X-axis. The abbreviations BM and TM refer to results
from the benchmark model and the tariﬀ model, respectively. The value for γ is speciﬁed
after the comma.
Note that s∗ is not deﬁned for all combinations of ϑ and γ (something we also encountered
in the benchmark model). Comparing total subsidy spending under the two regimes for
values of γ and ϑ,where s∗ is deﬁned, leads us to an even stronger conclusion than proposition
8. Not only are the proportion of subsidised ﬁrms lower under the countervailing regime for
given levels of s; also at optimal levels of s∗ total subsidisation outlays are lower in the
presence of countervailing tariﬀs. We summarise this in the following proposition:
Proposition 9 Countervailing duties restrict the total budget on subsidisation.
The intuition is that countervailing duties punish ﬁrms that rely on subsidies and push
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Figure 4: Total subsidy outlays; γ =0 .1;γ =0 .5
policy may help harden budget constraints in transition countries. In our approach, harden-
ing of budget constraints is eﬀected both through promoting restructuring of uncompetitive
ﬁrms and through restricting the total budget spent on subsidisation. Thus, given the fact
that domestic politicians cannot credibly commit to enforcing restructuring (a ﬁrst-best so-
lution for the home country, see Section 4), action by the foreign government might help
bring about this result. Remarkably, this result comes about when the foreign government
acts fully in its own interest, optimising its own social welfare by levying a welfare maximis-
ing countervailing tariﬀ. This highlights the advantage of our approach. Whereas previous
approaches to harden budget constraints stressed the need to privatise or demonopolise, or
the need to postpone EU application, they consistently overlooked the problem that com-
mitting to successful privatisation and demonopolisation or committing not to apply to EU
membership before ﬁrms are restructured, might be as big a problem as committing to hard
budget constraints. The advantage of our approach lies in the fact that domestic politicians
in our model endogenously respond to policies that are entirely outside their discretion, but
are optimal for the foreign government. It avoids shifting the commitment problem, and
thereby may be well worthwhile for policymakers to explore.
Our proposition in no way implies that we advocate reversion to protectionist policies.
While we are aware that some EU anti-dumping actions may have involved concessions to
special interests, in our model, special interest politics play a role in the transition country.
This gives rise to unfair trade practices in the CEECs against which welfare “restoring” tariﬀs
are levied. In a ﬁrst-best scenario, EU-style competition policies in transition countries
would be enforceable and granting aid to ineﬃcient ﬁrms would be prohibited. Hence,
countervailing policies would be made redundant. However, given the lack of commitment
on the side of domestic politicians to enforce budget discipline and the lack of commitment
to implement privatisation or demonopolisation programmes that wrest vested interests from
the socialist system, we argue second-best policies such as levying countervailing duties might
help overcome commitment problems domestic politicians are facing.
224 The social planner
We now turn to the implications for social welfare. A dictatorial social planner is not
subject to lobby behaviour, so we leave out contributions in calculating aggregate welfare.
Comparing the decisions of a social planner with the results obtained under Section 2 and 3
reveals the economic cost of political competition. More speciﬁcally, we compare






















where it is apparent that aggregate welfare is higher in the case of restructuring












This result is summarised as:
Proposition 10 The social welfare planner prefers to impose maximal restructuring on the
entire declining sector of the economy.
This result is in line with the literature on SBCs that emphasises its destructive conse-
quences for general welfare (see Section 1). SBCs are never welfare-enhancing (γ < 8
9).
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we developed a political-economy framework to analyse a ﬁrm’s choice between
investing in new technologies and lobbying for state support. We created a two-country, two-
sector model with rivaling political parties that mirror the interests of winners and losers
of SBCs. Lobby groups in our model attempt to aﬀect policy outcomes by contributing
to political parties, which, in turn, determines the relative proportion of restructured to
subsidised ﬁrms. However, in accordance with Magee et al. (1989), the levels of restructuring
and subsidy levels are chosen in a previous stage by the respective parties. This approach
was taken to emphasise the endogenous nature of state aid to ﬁrms, especially if we consider
state support to ﬁrms as a form of soft budget constraints. The model led to several insights.
First, it revealed that ﬁrms in the declining industry faced a tradeoﬀ between the cost of
lobbying and the beneﬁt of being subsidised, as the former could outweigh the latter. In
particular, the model predicts that, in the declining industry, the proportion of restructured
ﬁrms exceeds the proportion of subsidised ﬁrms. Second, levying countervailing tariﬀso n
subsidised exports shifted the decision in favour of restructuring and restrained total budget
spending on subsidisation, thereby hardening budget constraints. Thus, the model showed
that external constraints such as countervailing tariﬀs may help establish internal ﬁnancial
discipline where ﬁrst-best solutions are politically unfeasible. Third, we found that a social
23planner will always prefer full restructuring, implying that political competition comes at a
cost of lower economic welfare in our model.
The paper leaves several related issues unaddressed. Speciﬁcally, further research could
try to incorporate dynamic issues explicitly in the model by, say, repeating the stage game
of the model or allowing for diﬀerent production periods. Other possible areas to explore
are what happens when the foreign country also has the option to restructure or when the
cost of restructuring γ depends on the level of restructuring α. Finally, consideration of the
case where ﬁrms receive subsidies to support ongoing restructuring eﬀorts could have value.
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28Appendix
AB e n c h m a r k c a s e : π|1−q > π|q > 0
A.1 Model
• For interior or boundary solutions:
X |q > 0 ⇐⇒ cR(α) 6
1
2
=⇒ α > 0
X
f |q > 0 ⇐⇒ cR(α) > −1= ⇒ α 6
3
2
X |1−q > 0 ⇐⇒ s > 0
X
f |1−q > 0 ⇐⇒ s 6
3
2
• Conditions such that reaction functions fall at least partially in a positive quadrant
— Deriving the reaction functions from the FOCs dL
dCi =0gives rise a second-order
equation with the following solutions










— Restricting the solution of the Nash equilibrium in contributions to positive values,
we rule out the possibility of










Hence, we are left with reaction functions that are possibly positive for some
values of the other lobby’s contributions.
— The reaction function of Csme exhibits positive values when
−Csoe − 2ε −
p
4A(Csoe + ε) > 0
C
2
soe +( 4 ε − A)Csoe +4 ε
2 − Aε < 0
Since the coeﬃcient of C2
soe is positive, where the second-order equation has no
roots, C2
soe +( 4 ε − A)Csoe +4 ε2 − Aε < 0 will never be satisﬁed. Therefore, we
need
D = A













2 [.S i n c e−(4ε − A)+
√
D>0 ⇐⇒ −4ε + A +
√
D>0
for small values of ε, the reaction function will lie in the positive quadrant I (and
not in quadrant II where Csoe < 0,C sme > 0).
29— The reaction function of Csoe exhibits positive values if, completely analogously,
ε < −B








2 [.W i t h −(4ε + B)+ √
D>0 ⇐⇒ −4ε − B +
√
D>0 for small values of ε, the reaction function will
l i ei nt h ep o s i t i v eq u a d r a n tw h e r eb o t hCsoe,C sme > 0.
• Conditions for existence of intersection of the reaction function: Equilibrium
— Substitution of the reaction function Csoe into Csme g i v e sr i s et os o l v i n gas e c o n d -




sme +( 8 ε
(A − B)2
A2 +4 B)Csme +4 ε
2(A − B)2
A2 +4 εB =0
— Solutions exist when the discriminant is positive. Since the discriminant equals




−ε(A − B)2 − A2B
(A − B)2 ;−2ε
Solutions will intersect once in the positive quadrant, and once in the negative
quadrant.
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• Conditions for existence and stability of the equilibrium: Alternative approach
— Interpret the reaction functions as a (dynamic) system of diﬀerence equations:










30To write this into matrix notation, do a linear approximation (Taylor expansion)










soe (Csoe,t−1 − C
∗
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sme (Csme,t−1 − C
∗
sme)
= y + ricocsoe ∗ Csoe,t−1 − ricocsoe ∗ x
which is of the form
ut = Aut−1 + b
and can easily be rewritten, subtracting u∗ = Au∗ + b,a s
zt = Azt−1
— As o l u t i o nt out = Aut−1 + b exists if (I − A)−1 exists, i.e. if det(I − A) 6=0 .
det(I − A) 6=0⇐⇒ ricocsme ∗ ricocsoe 6=1
— Stability is guaranteed if the characteristic roots λi associated with det(A−λI)=
0 are |λi| < 1.
det(A − λI)=0 ⇐⇒ λ = ±
√
−ricocsme ∗ ricocsoei
|λi| < 1 ⇐⇒ −ricocsme ∗ ricocsoe < 1






























where c1,c 2 relate to the initial values at time t =0 , i.e. relate to z0 where our
dynamic system starts.
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(A−B)3(−2A2 − AB +3 B2)
< 0 ⇐⇒ γ < 8
9
Table 5: Comparative statics: q
• Comparative statics, reaction functions: See Table 3 and Figures 5 and 6.
• Comparative statics, equilibrium values: See Table 4.
• Comparative statics, q:s e eT a b l e5 .








































soe at equilibrium has a stronger negative eﬀect on q than increas-
ing C∗





















soe vary with the value of s, α and γ.
• Two special cases for s∗ can be envisaged in Stage 1:
— First, in the case where ϑ =0 , i.e. when politicians maximise social welfare
Ucon = W,t h ec h o i c eo fs∗ will involve zero levels of the subsidy. However, this
eliminates all competition on the political market, since both parties will be in
favour of maximal restructuring. This is in fact the solution of a social welfare
planner (see Section 4).
34— Second, the case where political parties care only about their self-interest, i.e. for
ϑ −→ +∞ and Ucon =1− q,t h ec h o i c eo fs∗ is given by lim
ϑ−→+∞
s∗(ϑ).T h i s
expression goes to inﬁnity for γ < 8
9, but since choices of s are restricted to
yield non-negative production levels, the subsidy will be chosen to maximally, i.e.
s∗ = 3






















the optimal choice of subsidy level will be constraint by the tax-raising capacity




∗∗X |1−q,s∗∗ = F.
• In equilibrium, utilities of interest groups are positive:
— Lsme > 0, provided F is large enough
— Lsoe > 0,a sw ec a nc a l c u l a t et h a ta tα∗ = 3
2
Lsoe = −ε +
AB2
(A − B)2 +
A(A − B)
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which is positive for γ < 8
9!
A.2 Extensions
We brieﬂy discuss some extensions of the model and perform some robustness checks with
respect to the model set-up and the assumptions.
• Comparative advantage
In the benchmark model, we have assumed that the SOE just breaks even when it
refrains from restructuring or does not receive any subsidies (c = 1
2). We could also
assume that the SOE is truly loss-making (c>1
2) and needs to be bailed out until its
proﬁts π|1−q =0 . However, for the SOE to prefer to get bailed out, we still need to
assume π|1−q > π |q.W i t hπ|1−q =0> π|q however, restructuring is no longer the
ﬁrst-best solution for welfare. Therefore, also in the case c>1
2,w en e e dt oa s s u m e
π|1−q > π |q > 0 such that little is changed compared to the analysis in the benchmark
case.
35• Population and industry distribution
In the above analysis, we have assumed that in the absence of contributions, ﬁrms face
an equal chance of being restructured and subsidised. This could be because this is the
outcome of a randomised experiment. Alternatively, we could ﬁnd this result deeper in
the structure of the economy, e.g. because employment is equally distributed among
the old and the new industry, and that, in the absence of campaign contributions,
workers always vote for the party that aligns with the interests of the sector in which
they are employed. Then both parties have an equal chance of winning the election.
Therefore, ε/2ε represents the importance of the growing sector in the total economy or
the direct impact of votes of the population. Contributions then shift this proportion
towards a diﬀerent political outcome.
Now, assume the SME-sector only represents 20% of total economic activity, whereas
the SOE is responsible for the remaining 80% of production and employment. How
does this aﬀect our results?
Note ﬁrst that probabilities over restructuring and subsidisation will be aﬀected ac-
cordingly, i.e. in the absence of contributions, 20% of economic activity in the SOE




Csme + Csoe +5 ε
1 − q =
Csoe +4 ε
Csme + Csoe +5 ε
.
For the reaction functions, this means we now have



















soe = −4ε +
AB2
(A − B)2.
Again, there is only a level change in the value of C∗
soe and other results are unaﬀected.
Again, A>−B =⇒ q>1
2 and results go through. However, the entire tax-absorbing
capacity of the SMEs could be smaller in case their share in the economy is relatively
small. However, such eﬀects can also be analysed in the framework presented above.
• Spillover eﬀects of restructuring to the SME sector
Suppose restructuring eﬀorts in the declining sector not only beneﬁtt h eg r o w i n gs e c t o r
indirectly by relieving its tax burden, but also by directly increasing proﬁts by an
amount δ α2
2 , i.e. proportionally to the amount of restructuring carried out by the
36SOE. The parameter δ captures the strength of these spillover eﬀects.37 This proﬁt
increase could take place because of a better resource allocation in the economy after
restructuring, or because of decreased labour overstaﬃng and decreased demand for
other inputs such as energy and raw materials, since they are now used in a more
eﬃciently after restructuring.38 These inputs are consequently more cheaply available
for the growing sector in the economy, increasing its proﬁts.
Including spill-over eﬀects into the lobby utilities yields:
Lsme = −Csme + q[F + δ
α2
2
]+( 1− q)[F − sX]
Lsoe = −Csoe + q[(P − cR)X − γ
α2
2
]+( 1− q)[(P − c + s)X].
Equilibrium contributions are completely analogous
C
∗

















Assuming spill-over eﬀects to the SME sector are strictly positive, i.e. δ > 0,i ti se a s y
to see that, for given levels of α and s,m o r eﬁrms will be restructured, since
A
00 >A>−B.
Note that the comparative statics results will be aﬀected accordingly as we now have
dA
dα 6=0 .
Alternatively, one could argue that positive spill-over eﬀects only manifest themselves
after considerable restructuring eﬀort and that small restructuring eﬀorts or one-sided
reforms even generate adverse spill-over eﬀects. In our speciﬁcation, this would imply,








+ δ2α, where δ2 < 0 < δ1
Such speciﬁcations greatly complicate the comparative statics results. We have thus
opted for a simple speciﬁcation where spill-over eﬀects are assumed to be non-existent.
37In a way, this term can be considered the counterpart of the cost of restructuring γ α2
2 by the ﬁrm in the
declining sector.
38Kornai (1980) precisely identiﬁed SBCs as the cause of perpetual shortages in socialist economies. It
was a situation where supply could not keep pace with demand.
37BC a s e : π|q > π|1−q > 0
B.1 Stage 2: Contributions
Suppose B>0, i.e. π|q > π|1−q. This means that restructuring is now also the preferable
policy to the SOE, e.g. because γ < 0. The “inherent” incentive to contribute has thus
changed. Note that the inherent incentive is related to the proportion of the population













Moreover, since no conﬂict in interest exists any longer, no contributions will be given,
i.e. C∗
i,j =0 .I . e .Li,j is maximised for C∗
i,j =0 .
B.2 Stage 1: Policy levels
Since
q 6= q(α,s)
the utility to politicians is now maximised at
dW
dα











CC a s e : π|q = π|1−q > 0
C.1 Stage 2: Contributions
Suppose B =0 , i.e. π|q − γ α2
2 = π |1−q. This could be because γ =0 .W e c a n t a k e 2
assumptions here.
• Only restructuring takes place. In this case, we are back in the case where restructuring
is strictly preferable.
• 50% of the SOE gets restructured, the remaining part gets subsidised
— It is immediately clear that an incentive to contribute on the part of the SMEs will
continue to exist in this case. Again, taking into account the ‘inherent’ incentive





38— Lobby utility Lsoe will be maximised for the SOE at C∗
soe =0 , but an explicit
incentive to contribute will exist on the part of SMEs. They maximise their
utility



















3εs ε < 2
√
6s
0 ε > 2
√
6s
C.2 Stage 1: Policy levels
We solve for our two assumptions.
• Only restructuring takes place. In this case, we are back in the case where restructuring
is strictly preferable.
• 50% of the SOE gets restructured, the other gets subsidised








The conservative party faces the analogous problem
max
s Ucon.
— We solve for both the case where C∗
sme = −4ε +
q
2
3εs and where C∗
sme =0 .
This corresponds to the cases where ε is small and large, respectively. In the
latter case, where ε is large, s∗ =0 . The intuition behind this result is that,
since contributions are zero, q and 1 − q are not a function of s,s u c ht h a tUcon
is maximised where W reaches a maximum. This is at the lowest possible level
of s.I nt h ec a s ew h e r eε is small, C∗
sme > 0.A s
d(1−q)
ds < 0 in this case and W a
concave function, we ﬁnd for low values of ϑ a non-negative solution for s∗.O n
the other hand, with ϑ high, the sign of
d(1−q)










8γ) ε < 2
√
6s;ϑ < 1
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